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Chile, as most Latin American countries, inherited the language, religion, and the
institutions from 16
th century Spanish conquerors. Most institutions have not changed
since. This paper examines the institutional and economic structure of the State in Chile.
It concludes that in several dimensions the current structure is incompatible with an
adequate functioning of market economies, as those intended by the economic reforms
implemented during the last three decades of the last century. The country needs to
implement reforms in the administration of the State, the working of the Judiciary
system, and the incentives and operation of regulatory agencies. Their combined
negative effects imply that the benefits of reforms,  privatization and market
liberalization are partially dissipated in the form of inefficiency and rent seeking
behaviour. In turn, this suggest that it is unlikely that the Chilean economy will reach the
high growth rates necessary to overcome under development.
Our main conclusion is that, in order to implement a framework in which the State acts
mainly as regulator and competition supporter, it is necessary to undertake profound
changes in the structure of incentives in which it currently operates. Five elements are at
the  center of this far-reaching evolution away from centralism, stagnation, and
inefficiency: (1) the divestiture of state-owned enterprises, (2) the upgrade and update of
regulatory agencies and the institutional framework in which they operate, (3) the
improve of competition policy institutions, (4) the improvement of consumer rights
protection, and (5) a substantial improvement in the working of the Judiciary system.
JEL Classification: H11, K21, K23, L51, L97
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decades, Chile has introduced major structural changes in infrastructure
and human capital accumulation that have given the private sector priority in goods and2 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE
services provision.  Partly motivated by the severe crisis of the early 1980s and partly by
the phenomenal success of the economies of the South East of Asia, Chile is in the path,
albeit hesitantly, towards the development of a market economy.
The first step in that direction has been taken already.  After sustained efforts, the
country has reached macroeconomic stability levels that would have been unthinkable
just twenty years ago, when inflation, unemployment and high fiscal and current account
deficits constituted the economic ailments of Chile. Nevertheless, this turn of the
economic situation has not been the result of only the stabilization process.  In addition,
there have been substantial changes in the incentives system for the economic agents that
were the result of privatizing state-owned companies, liberalizing markets, opening up
the economy to international trade and reducing subsidies to private companies.
To a great extent, Chile’s institutional structure is still incompatible with an efficient
operation of the very same markets the reforms were meant to create. The absence of
deep reforms in the State’s management, in the administration of the Judiciary and in the
working of regulatory agencies does not guarantee that the Chilean economy may reach
the high growth rates needed to pull the country out of its still developing condition.
Second generation reforms for the Latin American countries have been very much talked
about in order to complement the first liberalizing reforms that Chile implemented two
decades ago. However, we understand there has not been a clear systematization of what
those second generation reforms are, what they mean in terms of complementing first
generation reforms and, most importantly, what economic aims such reforms pursue.
This paper discusses and systematizes the kind of reforms that should be introduced and
the aims that  should be pursued. We understand the ruling principle of these reforms to
be the fact that a sustained economic growth demands a healthy microeconomy; that is
to say, the incentives and regulatory structure for the involved agents should be
implemented to reach the maximum potentialities in the productive and  allocative
efficiencies that the free operation of the markets imply. It is of particular interest in this
context that the government generates the most appropriate mechanisms to stimulate
competition and, were this is not possible, to design regulatory mechanisms to emulate
its results.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 3
To ensure progress in the direction of a State that regulates and defends competition,
Chile should perfect its regulatory framework and modernize the regulatory entities in
those industries with monopolistic characteristics; it should make progress in the defense
of consumer rights and of the individuals; it should strengthen the entities in charge of
assuring market competition and it should update the Judiciary by granting it the
capacity to settle the disputes that are typical of a market economy. This means that the
role of the State as the provider of goods and services should be reconsidered as well as
the way in which its actions may affect the implementation of the incentives and
punishments system the economic agents operate in.
The purpose of this paper is not to introduce a modernization plan. On the contrary, the
discussion is focused on the main aspects of economic and institutional modernization of
the State with respect to the needed redesign of institutions designed to regulate, to
control and to facilitate a fair market performance and competition as well as to ensure
the implementation of governance mechanisms to make the changes viable. This
analysis may be limited and should be complemented with reforms needed for the
country’s economic growth, which are not considered in this work: these reforms would
include upgrading employment supply (investment in human capital) and its association
with institutional health and education, the expansion of the country’s infrastructure,
environmental and natural resources protection, and others. Further, macroeconomic
growth aspects have not been included, such as the improvement of the saving-
investment process.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, the motivation for the
analysys is elaborated. Section three is about the need to change the role of the State in a
market economy like in Chile. Sections four and five deal with the two crucial aspects of
second generation reforms that constitute the core of this paper, the modernization of the
regulatory regime and support of competition, and the reform of the Judiciary and
defense of citizens and consumers. The conclusion will comprise section six.4 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE
2. THE ROLE OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT IN A GLOBALIZED
WORLD
The market liberalization reforms in Chile, most of them  introduced over the last quarter
century generated a sustained growth for about 15 years. However, the slowdown signs
over the first years of the 21st century are easily perceived. It has become evident that
the benefits that occurred after the first generation reforms may come to a standstill if
effective measures to solve the bottleneck problems of growth and, therefore, of the
country’s economic progress, are not undertaken.
1 In this paper, three basic principles,
which are clearly contentious, serve as the framework for the analysis that follows.
These principles are:
•  The Chilean economy in future will be developed on the basis of a market system as
a mechanism of resources allocation. Therefore, the institutional structure that the
country should have has to find the way for this mechanism to be as efficient as
possible and for the adverse effects of its failures to be averted or reduced.
•  The economy will increasingly be inserted in a globalized economic system, which
implies that Chile will have to develop the ability to benefit from the new system
and the capacity to defend themselves from the eventual problems that globalization
may bring about.
•  World economic growth will take place in an increasingly dynamic context where
change will be the most typical element in the interaction between economic agents,
industries and countries. Thus, the favored strategies should promote creativity,
equal opportunities, entrepreneurial capacity, and the ability to adapt to them.
Following such principles, the purpose of this section should be to generate discussion of
a rather broad set of problems concerning the functioning of the economy and the
institutional conditions of the State, which implies a thorough analysis that certainly
goes beyond this work. This is why we have concentrated on the problem areas which
                                                                
1 This paper is concerned especially with the institutional bottlenecks that hinder prolonged
economic growth, while those aspects that might eventually have an incidence in other
dimensions of the economic development process are not dealt with. This is, no doubt, a
subjective choice based on the widely accepted notion that economic growth constitutes a
necessary though not sufficient pre-condition for economic development.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 5
we believe are determining for future economic growth. Figure  Nº 1 shows the
interaction between globalization, markets, and the role of the State.





•   Reforming Economic Institutionality
•   Macroeconomic Policies
Market
Globalization
•   Social and Labor Policies
•   R&D Policies
From an economic standpoint, the growth problem is largely determined by the insertion
of Chile in the world economy. Such insertion will have major effects on the formation
of individual preferences, to the extent that consumption patterns, the appreciation of
creative leisure, working habits and other aspects will change.
2 Additionally, such
growth should modify the demand structure of goods and services in relation to the
elasticity of the introduction of goods, with “luxury” goods filling an ever larger slot in
the baskets of the different social classes.  As a consequence of globalization, not much
can be done to affect the demand of goods except for the first liberalizing measures:
fiscal, monetary, and current and capital account policies consistent with a health
macroeconomy.
                                                                
2  There is a wide literature regarding  the effects of globalization on other aspects of the
citizens’ life, such as culture, identity, and so on. See for instance Brunner (1995) and
Larraín (2001) for futher discussion.6 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE
Bearing in mind this multifaceted challenge imposed by globalization, three The demand
of goods and services also reflect the effects of globalization. The globalization
conditions pose for Chilean producers a major challenge to reach the productivity and
efficiency levels of those in international markets. Such challenges are not only
technological but, most importantly, related to the idea that globalization will demand
ever increasing levels of creativity, negotiating skills and adaptation to changes and
working habits in order to offer high quality products and productive processes. This is
the reason why the Chilean government is extremely concerned with advancing in the
reform of education, health, and social welfare.
State areas in Chile have been identified that may turn into major bottlenecks to
adequately respond to the challenge. These areas of concern are: structure, mangement
and administration of the public sector (the State’s role) in a market economy;
governance structure and mechanisms in the regulatory entities; and, the operation of the
Judiciary system, the defense of citizens and consumers.
We estimate that the first area cited above, the structure, management and administration
of the public sector, poses a severe threat to economic development. There is significant
heterogeneity today in the level of efficiency of the different units of the public sector;
while in some of them directives are clear and high performance efficacy has been
reached, in others management is highly bureaucratic and administration is disorderly
with high inefficiency levels and political interference. Also, the State’s entrepreneurial
spirit is still debatable especially given the fact that  they still control a significant
percentage of the GDP, indicating further opportunities for first generation reforms.
With respect to the institutional condition and governance of the regulatory entities,
reforms are needed whenever a greater participation of the private sector has been
reached in typical state activities such as telecommunications, electricity, and transport.
Rapid privatization often preceded the design of the regulatory framework, which may
have been thought out hurriedly, with little experience and not much care. In brief,
privatization was carried out without the corresponding considerations with respect to
market failures inherent to the industries involved, especially when the potentially
competitive market activities coexisted with those in monopilistic markets.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 7
The weak institutional condition is also strongly present in the organizations in charge of
defending and supporting free market competition. The institutions are still very much
inclined to punish inappropriate conduct but have spent little time with implementing
mechanisms to avoid such conduct. In other words, it is necessary that the institutions
established for the defense of free competition modify their role in favor of supporting
competition.
Chile shows major defficiencies in the institutional weaknesses associated with settling
disputes between parties, typical of all market economies. On the one hand, the Judiciary
is one of the most backward in Chile, where procedures are still very similar to those in
colonial times. Many members of the judiciary lack an economic background and, worse
still, they seem to be far detached from being able to assess their work and, therefore, are
not very much concerned with settling disputes promtly and efficiently. A similar case
can be observed with respect to the bodies for the defense of consumers and persons;
legislation is outdated and permissive with practices that are detrimental to the social
acceptance of the free market model that has been implemented.
3
In summary, Figure Nº 2 shows the need to implement an institutional structure in
accordance with a regulator competition-supporter State that acts along with a Judiciary
system and institutions for the defense of citizens and consumers. It is of interest to lay
stress on the importance of institutional changes and on their effects on economic growth
by means of what is called a healthy microeconomy.
                                                                
3  Since written the first draft of this paper, the Chilean government has implemented several
reforms that attempt to solve the problems mentioned in this work. Some of them are: the
introduction of payment incentives schemes in public officers,  the reform to electricity,
consumer, and antitrust acts (all of them enacted during 2003 and 2004), and several other
iniciatives still under legislative discussion.8 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE


















3. MODERNIZATION OF THE STATE: GENERAL ASPECTS
Over the last three decades, substantial structural changes have been made that have
given the private sector greater prominence in the provision of goods and services, in
developing infrastructure and in human capital accumulation. However, the institutional
structure of Chile’s economy, especially its state apparatus, to a large extent happen to
be incompatible with an efficient operation of the very same markets that the reforms
were meant to create.
Most authors agree that the State in Latin America, at least traditionally, reached its
nadir in the 1990s (Boeninger, 1999; Burki et al., 1999). Historically, the State in Chile
has developed a so-called “bureaucratic culture”, characterized by institutional featuresDOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 9
that indicate, on the one hand, severe administrative, structural and organizational
problems and, on the other, the undeniable need to implement profound changes.
4
The State apparatus in Chile is characterized by bureaucratic excesses and rigid
procedures; this results in an exasperating slow pace to respond to social needs. It is
rightly perceived that management is oriented to conforming to routine procedures and
that solutions are based only on expanding the use of inputs (“more of the same”), while
obtaining results is not regarded as relevant. In this context, public action is typically
explained in terms of bureaucratic dynamics, of following a career, and of short-term
political imperatives, not in terms of the interest in solving the population’s problems.
There may be genuine interest in improving the population’s living standards, but it is
not unusual to have efforts wasted because too many of the institutions involved are in
charge of the same issues without coordination, because there is no consistency or
clearly defined public policy objectives and, more sadly still, because the
implementation of public plans does not respond to the most elementary constraints of
the reality around (such as the so-called “white elephants”). In the worst of cases, the
State does not seek the common good and it acts in the name of interest groups, political
parties or social classes, developing state policies oriented to getting adherence and
followers.
The causes of the State’s inefficiency are, then, many, inclusive of historical, cultural,
economic and legal factors. In our approach, we have concentrated on the economic and
institutional determinants, although the conclusions that can be derived from a legal or
political analysis are no less important.
From an economic standpoint, the origin of the State’s inefficiency and inefficacy is to
be found in the absence of proper incentives and regulation mechanisms in public
                                                                
4 The State in Latin America derives its centralist conception, according to some historians,
from a combination of (1) acceptance of vertical authority promoted by a conservative
Catholic Church; (2) profound inequalities in social relations; (3) high concentration of
wealth; (4) low educational levels and (5) marginalizing indigenous groups from national
politics (Domínguez, 1994).10 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE
organizations as well as in private cases. Chile is not alone here since the whole of Latin
America is known for the absence or generalized weakness of the public administration
evaluation mechanisms to assess private or organizational achievements and to punish
indolence, inefficiency and lack of endeavor to attain the assigned objectives. The
absence of accountability or personal responsibility is the result. Furthermore, the State
in Chile has traditionally paid little attention to public opinion; thus, tax payers do not
stand the chance of getting informed concerning the destiny given to their taxes or, let
alone, to find the way to best use them, or recall public officers who are inept or corrupt.
To some extent, the reason for the lack of accountability and recall lies in the restriction
of resources that prevent the development of proper mechanisms. Nevertheless, it must
be acknowledged that, rather than the limited funds, the institutional restrictions imposed
on the State are far more important.
On the one hand, inefficiency in the implementation of public resources is due to the
labor overprotection enjoyed by public officers. Very often, officers enjoy labor tenure,
their income is related to fixed salary schemes and negotiated collectively, and they get
promoted on the basis of seniority. This situation is not linked to the kind of efforts
generally needed to obtain rewards; thus, workers become discouraged to make efforts
which are not appreciated while the opportunism of those who do their least seems to be
welcomed. On the other hand, there is no “public managers” in public organizations, as
there is in private enterprises, commissioned by owners and responsible before them, to
obtain given social benefits from the assigned resources.
5
Updating the structure of the public sector is a manifold area that involves privatization,
restructuring organizations and functions, decentralizing, updating information systems
and training personnel, among other needs. A thorough analysis of this situation is not
the pretense in this section; rather, focusing attention on a possible reordering of the
State with a view to developing market economy, with increasing private participation
                                                                
5  As mentioned, some incentive  mechanisms and a newer, formal, open, and transparent
process of hiring public managers/officers were implemented during 2003. Although this
reform this not solve the problem, it is a enormeous step in the right direction. See details
of this reform in Valdés-Prieto (2003).DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 11
levels in the provision of goods and services and with a greater consumer participation in
policy making is the purpose.
In his classic study of goods and services provision, Oates (1972) mentions the three
basic objectives of the State: stabilization, resources allocation and distribution of
wealth. In this paper, we concentrate on the last two as they constitute the most
important objectives in Chile in the present time. Nevertheless, we have disaggregated
resources allocation into three categories: the provision of ordinary goods and services,
the provision of public goods and services, and the generation of norms and regulations
(what we may refer to as governance), with the aim of deeply examining the challenges
that stand in the way of the State modernization and transformation in Chile. The three
aspects related to resources allocation along with redistribution mechanisms and equal
access make up the first part of our analysis.
In summary, the functions of the State have been classified into three different levels:
decision making (deciding how much and for whom to produce), management (how to
produce), and the incentives mechanism plan and performance assessment (which the
production rules are).
6 Figure Nº 3 shows the double entry matrix with both analyses,
which will serve as guidance. In each box, we give our considerations, which are the
consequence of the analysis that follows next.
                                                                
6  Is pertinent to mention that Chile has the lowest level of corruption indicators in Latin
America and one of the lowest in the world (ranks 18-20 out of 145 countries in 2003). If
this were not the case, another crucial  topic in the reform of the State should be the
controlling of corruption.12 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE

















After the military coup d’  etat in 1973, Chile conducted the important process of
privatizing many of the state-owned enterprises. Nonetheless, the State is still present in
economic areas linked to mining, the energy sector and basic services, among others.
Even admitting that State ownership in itself is not necessarily inappropriate, historical
experience suggests that privatizing and granting concessions seem to allow a better
management of the resources, less extended corruption and greater efficiency without
causing serious market distortions.
It must be pointed out that there is general awareness in Chile that the State offers no
advantages in the decision making process related to production and investment levels
and in providing goods and services where no externalities or particular production
conditions are be found (e.g., economies of scale). The idea that the State should
coordinate or plan market development, that it should administer better than the private
sector or that it should offer more efficient incentives mechanisms for resources
allocation has been abandoned. On the contrary, it is the public sector that increasingly
seeks to incorporate incentives systems that partly replicate the private sector
mechanisms. This is why the first row in figure  Nº 1 shows that it is possible and
advisable to grant the provision of ordinary goods and services to the private sector and
allow the latter to decide on what, how and for whom to produce, and also allow it to
find the most convenient incentives and control mechanisms within the legal framework
of the different societies concerned.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 13
Regarding the provision of public goods and services, there is no consensus over the
need or convenience of divesting public companies in these markets. Many authors
maintain that state ownership is justified in terms of market imperfections such as
natural monopolies and public goods. In such cases, it is said, privatization would lead to
a goods and services provision level below optimum and, by and large, would lead the
private sector to enjoy monopolistic benefits. However, there is no empirical evidence to
support the assertion that when the State operates monopolistically, the proper
production level is assured. On the contrary, there is substantial proof that many public
companies are highly inefficient and that the monopolistic benefits are appropriated by
the executive officers or the employees in the form of high salaries and fringe benefits
(Galal et al., 1989).
The privatization experience in Chile in public utilities shows that private ownership
may reduce prices and provide incentives to invest. However, this experience also shows
that the privatization of utilities demand a carefully designed regulatory framework free
of ambiguities, with legal and regulatory entities willing to enforce the terms and
conditions of privatization or concession contracts. Moreover, during the 1990s Chile
started to develop markets where the private sector operates and, in many cases, finance
companies that provide goods and services, such as highways, ports and airports
franchising.  The Chilean state continues to be responsible for determining the provision
levels, which is made possible through private companies with the assistance of
subsidies or franchising mechanisms.
A widespread justification for the maintenance of some state-owned companies is that
they play a strategic political role, such as by media (newspapers and television) and
military or war related companies. Their social role must be admitted, but the evaluation
of the extent to which they are strategic for social development and of the extent to
which they may prove useful to perpetuate spheres of power in the hands of privileged
classes or power groups must be conducted carefully. For instance, the arguments in
favor of state monopolies based on military strategic reasons, those which formerly
explained the development of war industries, have lost ground with economic
liberalization and globalization. Currently, the destiny of taxes for national defense is
being debated because, on the one hand, the perception is that the need for defense has14 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE
diminished in Latin America; on the other hand, such use of taxes greatly reflect the
military negotiating power rather than Chile’s need of defense.
Similarly, the need to maintain an state bank in Chile has been its role in regional
development, especially in the areas lagging behind progress where private capital
markets cannot support productive activities. The less developed sectors, such as rural
and small business, certainly demand the substantial support of the rest of society to
integrate them more equitably in the process of economic growth. This suggests
assistance that should be well targeted, particularly access to loans and to technical aid,
and not necessarily directed to expanding state enterprises in the areas.
As a consequence, it should be pointed out that although the State may divest public
goods and services provision, the responsibility for the decision on which goods and
services are provided and who will provide them cannot be referred to the private sector.
Given the presence of market failures, centralized coordination of the provision levels is
required in order to obtain a social optimum from the allocation of resources.
A third objective of the State is to provide operation rules for the economic agents and
also to provide the mechanisms to adapt, update and upgrade such rules. Such
governance as a State function has been recently changed in many economies in Latin
America as a result of the openness processes and market liberalization implemented
over the last 25 years. However, because it has been the pioneer in introducing
liberalization policies and because of the dogmatism with which such policies were
conducted, Chile is still lagging behind institutional reforms compared with other
countries whose divestiture processes took place later.
Certainly, we are dealing with an area where decision making is a public responsibility
exclusively. The private sector may participate with regulation improvement proposals,
as is the case in Chile, but the mechanisms used for such proposals must be transparent
and efficient, without the margin for the regulating agent to be captured by the regulated
enterprises. Similarly, the administration of the bodies that dictate the regulations and
panel procedures must belong to the State, given the need to protect the collective good
above individual or group interests, an issue to be dealt with later in this paper.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 15
A less developed area that may play a very important role in the future is a more direct
consumer participation in the results and incentives control of public decisions. The
centralist characteristic of the state administration has traditionally led to little consumer
participation in the decisions of the state-owned enterprises and bodies. As has been
already remarked, this situation means the neglect on the part of state officers when
having to comply with their social function as well as the disappointment of users
concerning the capacity of the State to resolve problems. It has recently been proposed
that public hearings be organized to discuss and fix public tariffs or service conditions,
with the participation of consumers together with the enterprises and regulation
representatives. It would certainly improve accountability of the regulating agents and
also improve consumer welfare. The right to recall must be exercised responsibly; it has
been seldom resorted to, with bureaucratic complications, so that a major reconsideration
of it must be made to turn it efficient.
Regarding income and opportunities distribution, Chile’s unequal income distribution is
perhaps one of the major challenges confronting this country in the 21
st century. Initially,
the interest of public policies would be to guarantee universal access to the benefits a
market economy offers and to the duties it demands. Nevertheless, it must be admitted
that there are substantial distortions and constraints that actually prevent equal access
that, to a large extent, explain the active policy participation of the State.
There are two kind of policies to reduce inequality and guarantee equal opportunities.
On the one hand, since the works by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972), there has been a
strong school of thought that suggests that the allocation of resources is economically
efficient in providing local goods and services when it has been divested and the
decision made at local level. On the other hand, there still are a wide scope for policies
aim to reduce poverty and unequal opportunities at the central level.
Whichever the decentralization level chosen, decision making will, then, be a mixed
function. The State should centrally retain those redistribution proposals that because of
externalities or of economies of scale are of national scope, or those in which there is no
capacity to pay at all (assistance).16 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE
4. TOWARD A MODERN R EGULATORY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMING
AND DEFENSE OF COMPETITION
Mention has already been made of the private sector participation in sectors with natural
monopoly characteristics in Chile during the final quarter of the last century, especially
in gas, energy, water and telecommunications. With adequate regulation, it should bring
about increased internal efficiency in those companies (productive efficiency) and
should also offer benefits to consumers, as the literature in the field has underlined
7.
Nevertheless, as some authors have shown, the term “adequate regulation” happens to be
a chimera in many such sectors; severe efficiency problems in the allocation of resources
have arisen when control was tightened over the market regulated monopoly that was
expected to perform more competitively
8. The question we now mean to address is: how
far can we go with an institutional development proposal capable of guaranteeing a
balanced development of the advantages of productive and internal efficiency of the
private sector in the public utility services area, together with the adequate competition
support and consumer defense in those sectors?
4.1 Competition Regulator and Supporter Institutional Structure
Following the rich empirical evidence available, it has become clear that all those market
segments with monopolistic characteristics and operated by private enterprises must be
regulated. Then, it is assumed that the disadvantages of regulation, measured in terms of
direct and indirect costs, are fewer than the advantages with respect to the social benefits
they bring about. In this sense, and from a practical standpoint, we rule out as irrelevant
the existence of challenging markets in basic services.
Market regulation though is not problem-free. The theoretical and empirical literature on
monopoly regulation of public services remarks that the information asymmetries
                                                                
7  A very good summary of such experiences can be found in Newbery (1999).
8  See for instance Basañes, Saavedra and Soto (2001) and Bitrán, Estache, Guasch and Serra
(1999), who are critical of the poor regulatory framework for basic services in Chile.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 17
between the regulated firms and the regulators mean a serious constraint to reach
allocation efficiency in these markets. The information asymmetries originate in the
greater and closer knowledge of the technologies used and of the market conditions
enjoyed by the monopolists. As a result of such information asymmetries, “informational
rent” is derived and strategic behavior is encouraged by the economic agents.
In sectors with natural monopoly characteristics, the problem is exacerbated to the
degree public utility services are vertically related to potentially competitive markets;
such is the case of the fixed telephone network and mobile telephone, long distance
calling and data transmission, electricity distribution with (potentially) competitive
generation and marketing segments, the  poliducts to transport natural gas and
corresponding extraction and marketing. These vertical relations between monopolistic
markets and competitive markets allow the market power of these firms on regulated
markets to be used to obtain abnormal benefits in potentially competitive markets.
In principle, the way to reduce informational rent consists of establishing and
implementing regulatory frameworks that provide clear solid rules from a technical point
of view. Additionally, it is necessary for the regulatory agents to have trained staff to
demand compliance with the rules and, in case problems arise, to count on a panel of
legal experts capable of settling the matter between the individual parties and, or
between the involved party and the State an open expeditious way. A further point is that
the regulatory frameworks be capable of modifying and adapting to the economic
changes that inevitably occur. The problem that arises is how to ensure that the changes
in regulation are not anti-efficiency, and that they do not generate rent for the monopolist
or not allow the political capture of the regulator.18 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE
4.2  Bottlenecks in the Regulatory Institutional Structure
In practice, particularly in many developing countries, there are many constraints that
prevent regulators from inhibiting rent seeking in those sectors where private firms
operate in monopolistic conditions. This is mainly due to three reasons: our regulatory
entities are technically weak to implement the existing regulations; the regulatory
framework is in many cases incomplete or is the source of great ambiguities; regulation
is particularly complex occasionally, from the technical point of view.
a)  Weak Technical Capacities in Regulatory Entities
As is the case all over Latin America, the first constraint for regulatory entities in Chile
is the limited technical capacity offered by the regulatory agents. This technical
weakness is due to three main reasons: no independence from political power, no
independent budgeting  and low salaries.
With respect to the  no independence from political power, basic services regulation
authorities in Chile are officers who enjoy the total confidence of the President of the
Republic, who can decide whether they can stay in office, without following clear
procedures to support the decision. Lobbying is, then, made possible, and the regulatory
bodies may be inhibited concerning the implementation of required technical measures
that are politically costly.
As far as the lack of independent budgeting is concerned, in Chile, the national fiscal
budget is the source of funds of the regulatory entities and, therefore, they operate within
the institutional framework of the public sector. As discussed in the previous section, the
incentives plan for the public sector shows severe constraints that do not allow it to
function efficiently (rigidity, bureaucracy). In only a few countries, like Argentina and
Brazil, the regulatory entities are financed with specifically created taxes or with the
proceeds generated by private exploitation rights in regulated markets. However, such
possibility has not been proposed seriously for implementation in Chile.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 19
Finally, the salary scheme of public officers is not consistent with the maintenance and
training of the staff’s technical capacity. The empirical evidence of this problem is clear:
the remunerations in the public sector are below those in the regulated industry, which
favors regulatory capture; secondly, there are very few incentives that foster specialized
training among the staff and the development of a career within the regulatory entities.
Both conditions deter the best young professionals from exploring jobs with the
regulatory agency; consequently, they are then generally captured (hired) by the private
sector.
b)  Incompleteness and Ambiguities of the Regulatory Framework
The second serious regulation problem in Chile is that the regulatory framework is, in
some very important circumstances, highly incomplete and or ambiguous. The
institutional or contractual structure ruling relations between the regulator and the firm
does not predict all the possible contingencies of operating the sector, or imparts
political guidelines which are inconsistent. The existence of ambiguities in any kind of
regulation is usually the result of both the complexity of the phenomenon dealt with and
the incapacity to predict and anticipate potential conflicts derived from regulating in a
poor information context. The presence of ambiguities or the absence of definitions in
regulating generally causes opportunistic conduct on the part of both the regulated
enterprise and the State institutions.
Tangible examples of ambiguities within the regulatory framework of basic services
have arisen over the last years in different countries in Latin America. In Chile’s energy
sector, for example, the absence of definition of the responsibilities when a period of
drought occurred made the crisis worse and, first in a long time, led to rationing of
consumption, which might have been avoided. In telecommunications, the authority has
had to constantly create regulations to prevent local telephone companies from wielding
their monopolistic power in other more competitive markets (long distance,  mobil
telephony, Internet, etc.). The fishing activity overexploitation in Chile has caused long
negotiations to impose constraints to make the sector’s development sustainable. The20 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE
opportunistic conduct in some road construction concessions may reduce the
government’s credibility, which in turn may produced suboptimum investments.
9
c)  Complex Regulation and Regulation by Incentives
A third problem occurring not only in developing countries is the fact that regulation
may prove especially complex from a technical point of view; there is no consensus with
respect to the best possible regulatory regime. Regulation is often confronted with
economic and technical problems for which there are no theoretical or practical solutions
(for example, electricity transmission rates). Additionally, technological progress often
causes substantial changes in market operation and renders the former regulation
obsolete. Even the technological changes may defy the very definition of what
constitutes “a market” regulated by an authority. Two examples may be useful: one of
them is found in telecommunications, where mobile telephone’s boom and cheap prices
have made it a closer substitute for land based telephones. In turn, this puts the regulator
in a difficult position to decide which market is relevant for the regulation of fixed
telephones; in the other instance, more importance will be given in the medium term to
investment cost reduction and network operation, which will make electricity
distributors request authorization to offer telephone service (and vice-versa). The
regulator will have to face network integration and competition conflicts between
economic sectors.
Certainly, there are no simple solutions or prevention of these problems. What must be
demanded of regulation is the capacity to face complexities with mechanisms capable of
supplying an appropriate consensus-based solution within a reasonable period, and, also,
                                                                
9  As mentioned again, recent legal modifications tends to reduce some ambiguities in these
regulatory frameworks. Two examples are the following. In the electricity sector, firms are
clear  regarding  their  responsabilities in  providing  energy  during  droght ( reform
implemented in 1999), they know their transmission tariffs and that private arbitrators are
going to settle any disputes among them (both reform implemented in 2004). The second
example is how the government settle lobbying into the fishery sector, where a 10 years
operating act was enacted in 2001 in order to make clear the operation of the sector for a
decade before enacting a new definitive act for this sector,  to be operative in 2011.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 21
if regulation mistakes are found, to provide effective mechanisms to correct them.
Unfortunately, very often the regulation mechanisms are not easily modified.
4.3  What To Do with the Regulatory Institutional Structure?
There is still a lot to be learned although regulatory problems have been widely debated
at the moment of establishing the regulatory institutional structure. Most problems are in
sectors whose regulatory framework was designed in the 1980’s. For example, the
regulation of Chile’s energy sector, a pioneer in allowing competition for generation at
that time, has remarkably lagged behind and has raised severe operational problems,
with conflicts and growing litigation in the sector.
However, some reforms introducing competition in other sectors are remarkably
positive. For example, telecommunications regulation in Chile, quite precarious initially,
has evolved toward establishing better and more effective local telephone regulation
regimes. More significantly yet, the government made a great effort to implement a long
distance  multicarrier system that brought about a major increase of the sector’s
competition and competitiveness and has reduced rates to the benefit of consumers
10.
Similarly, the opening up of public bids for road construction and the privatization of
water companies have incorporated the experience of the previously privatized sectors to
correct possible mistakes and to avoid the opportunistic conduct of the regulated
enterprises (Basañes, et al., 2001).
In spite of the general good performance of the regulatory experience in Chile, there is
still much that remains to be done to update the regulatory institutional conditions. Not
only is it necessary to give the regulatory entities technical and financial capacity but
also they must receive the minimum required directives to ensure economic and political
independence with respect to their environment. It is additionally necessary to allow
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them to identify and resolve ambiguities, to increase transparency in administrative
procedures, to go forward with incentives regulation mechanisms, and to reach
economies of scope in regulation, in competition support and in the defense and
information to consumers. Although a thorough treatment of the mentioned directives is
not the pretense, the last introduced elements will be further dealt with.
i. Regulatory Entities Independence
The regulatory organizations must be given independence from political power and from
the regulated sectors themselves. This presupposes deep changes when defining the
regulatory institutional conditions of the basic services in Chile, whose minimum
directives should at least guarantee:
•  Separating the regulatory entities according to the economic activities. For various
reasons, it is advisable not to centralize regulation in a sole entity. First, the
regulation of the different sectors (energy, gas, telecommunications, others) is
highly heterogeneous from the point of view of the technical, economic and,
particularly, the development level of each sector. Secondly, this would make
accountability of the corresponding superintendents easier. Thirdly, the regulated
enterprises and the political parties would be less motivated to capture a very
powerful regulator. Finally, the interruption of regulation activities of sectors that
for political reasons or other circumstances are less appealing than other activities
would be diminished.
11
•  Regulatory entities economically and hierarchically independent of ministries. It is
required that political authorities, and their activities concerning the sector’s
development and competitiveness, be separated from the role of regulator with
respect to the regulatory function the latter exercises. This eliminates the political
dependence of regulators, avoids the opportunistic conduct of the government with
aims other than the long-term development of the sector and reduces the political
capture motivation;  the regulators’ technical capacity and the implementation of
                                                                
11  It is important to remark that this separation of regulatory entities that not prevent for
create the figure of a supraregulator of utilities, however this position should be think as a
person whose aim is beyond any technical regulation, more precisely this person should be
in charge of balance power with private holdings operating in more than one utility sector.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 23
more efficient mechanisms is made operative, from the point of view of the
incentives and career making chances with these entities.
•  Allowing the President of the Republic the ability to appoint and to remove
superintendents, but in both cases using a transparent process. In fact, the
President’s decision regarding the appointment of a regulator is not a big deal, but
what is important is that the removal of a regulator should be based upon specific
and transparent conditions, such as proven negligence, abandon of duties, regulatory
capture, corruption, an so on.
ii. Strengthening of the Regulatory Entities
The institutional capacity of the regulating agents must be strengthened so that they can
solve ambiguities efficiently within the regulatory framework of the basic services. Not
much has been done to identify them and, thus, change norms and regulations.
Unfortunately, it is only when opportunistic conduct appears that the mentioned
ambiguities also appear. Three minimum necessary though insufficient changes to
improve this situation are:
•  To provide regulators and comptroller agents with the human and financial
resources that could allow them to perform their function on equal conditions as the
basic services companies under their supervision. An interesting aspect to analyze is
the possibility for the regulatory agent to be partly financed with taxes on the
regulated enterprises themselves, with some clear objective mechanism as, for
example, being paid for the job they do. Although this is the way used in very few
countries in Latin America, the experience of the regulatory agents in Argentina
(ENRE and ENERGAS) has been clearly successful on this regards.
•  To go further with the implementation of dispute settling mechanisms of conflicts
occurring outside current legal proceedings  and with the enforcement of the
solutions contributed with by private arbitrage may prove convenient in the short
run. The electricity act enacted in March 2004 certainly is in this direction, whose
example should be imitate at least in the telecommunications and water and sewage
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•  To study how to adapt to the regulatory framework, with reference to the significant
policies in each individual sector, should, in the medium term, be centered on the
ministries, not on the regulatory organisms. The latter should only provide support
to the technical work done by ministries; they should not become involved in
fostering the deep changes in the norms ruling the sector they themselves regulate.
The regulatory agencies would then become technical bodies only; the political
discussions inherent in the transformations in the regulatory structure could, then, be
avoided. On the other hand, the strengthening of the regulatory institutions would
reduce the existing ambiguities within the regulatory framework and also the
underlying opportunistic conduct entailed in them.  
iii. Transparency of the Regulatory Process
The regulatory entities procedures must be updated to have transparency in the
regulation process. This suggestion points in the direction of helping with the profound
changes that imply the regulators’ independence. An indirect way to achieve the
independence of the regulatory entities is to reform the procedures they are ruled by in
order to make them transparent. Some minimum requirements in this direction are:
•  The demand to back up the decisions made by regulators and comptrollers.  For
example, it is desirable that the methods the regulator follows to make decisions,
particularly tariffs decisions, could be replicated by third parties, especially
independent academicians; the regulators should have the obligation to substantiate
their assumptions and judgments in written form.
•  The adoption of a comprehensive administrative procedure applicable whenever the
regulator makes a decision. Apart from helping to reach transparency in the
decisions, this could foster public participation in the process because it would
allow those who were interested to have the opportunity of having a say in public
and of becoming involved in the decision making process. 
•  The open supply of regulatory activity information. This could be accomplished by
publishing Internet pages that, by offering all the information available, would thus
do away with third party entry barrier to access information. Likewise, regulators
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under strict confidentiality conditions, in order to increase knowledge about the
working of utility sectors.
•  Implementation of regulatory accounting in basic services. This systematization of
information can help with system transparency, with the memory preservation. By
doing so, it can generate stability in the procedures used and in the rules of the game
for the regulated enterprises themselves.
The procedural changes suggested should enhance the prospects of making the regulator
accountable in the hope that it will help to control administrative acts by binding them to
minimum procedural standards.  Similarly, and closely related, is the need to create,
along with the procedural reform, a system to allow those affected to present claims in
case the transparency rules may have been trespassed. This issue is dealt with further in
the next section.
iv. Incentives Mechanisms
For regulation to be successful, the means used must be improved. Regulation should be
direct; this means a regulation is applied and non compliance with it is punished. Indirect
regulation seems to be better: the inclusion of market elements in regulation. The aim is
to modify the incentives so that the agents’ interest lies in “complying” with the
regulation. This approach enjoys certain advantages concerning regulation costs. Both
kinds of regulation are necessary, but different legal bodies might change many direct
regulations and displace them with other more indirect or with incentives.
As an example, more competition in telecommunications has allowed local telephone
companies to enter different market segments, the interest of the new firms being to
capture clients with more important demands. Because of the rigid legislation, the
incumbent cannot react to greater competition by offering alternative plans as quickly as
an efficient operator would be expected to do, given the months it takes to obtain
authorization from the regulator to make the offer. In terms of incentives, what may
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maintain the regulated tariffs option, while, ex-post ensuring that these practices are
neither discriminatory nor predatory.
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v. Best Use of Economies of Scope in utilities’ Regulation
Finally, the governance structure must be redefined in order to make the best use of
economies of scope and to enhance the interaction between the regulator role and the
competition entities role. The responsibility for  the defense of competition belong
typically to other public entities: Fiscalía Nacional Económica (the Chilean simil to the
Department of Justice in USA) and the Antitrust Commissions (currently the
Competition Court, an special court in charge to settle disputes on this regard). The
responsibility for the defense of consumers it is the responsibility of SERNAC
(Consumer National Agency).
However, the problems concerning basic services present high specificity and are
complex to resolve. Experience has shown that involving these entities may cause severe
problems, in particular regarding co-regulation of utilities. It is extremely important to
clearly define the role of each institution, to separate duties and avoid inconsistencies in
regulation, and to enhance communication among them in order to facilitate their
working.
4.4 Bottlenecks in the Promotion and Defense of Competition 
13
Establishing modern regulatory institutional conditions in a market economy open to a
globalized world demands an institutional structure for the defense of competition to
                                                                
12  In fact, Telefonica obtained the right to offer flexible  plans  to  its  subscribers in local
telephony  from  the  Antitrust  Commission ( currently,  Competition  Court) in 2003.
However, such a flexibility requires  Telefonica  to  obtain a  permit from  the  regulator
before implementing any alternative plan.
13  Most of these problems were solved upon the creation of the Competition Court, which
replaced the Antitrust Commisions. The new law was enacted at the end of 2003 and the
first draft of this article was used as a discussion paper for implementing  such a reform.
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complement it in order to reach the aim of supporting competition. Therefore, it is
necessary to have commissions and a legal system in charge of watching over
competition in markets involving oligopoly (or potentially competitive); especially, the
markets related to regulated basic services.
It has proven advantageous to separate functions: fact finding and investigating unfair
practices on the one hand; making legal and other decisions, on the other. In the first
case in Chile, the work is done through the Fiscalía Nacional Económica); the legal
work is in charge of the Antitrust Commissions (from now on, indistinctly Competition
Court). Within this institutional structure, the antitrust commissions function like the
courts of the judicial power system and they should be, in theory, independent of any
other public office. The Fiscalía was thought of as a public service branch with its own
separate budget and staff; in Chile, it is directly dependent on the President of the
Republic.
We believe various problems restrict the scope of these entities. They are:
•  The aims of the antitrust commissions are often not clear or are poorly defined. The
objectives the commission members follow to make their evaluation vary
immensely, from commissions whose task is to defend competition to those whose
responsibility is to defend consumer rights, market development, or other aims. This
is the reason why, even in the same country, similar unfair practices have been
judged following different criteria.
•  Insufficient professionalism of the commissions.  The first restrictive factor is to
work exclusively according to the sense of responsibility the commission members
may have; they obtain no remuneration for the job done, do not have advisors to
support their decisions and cannot neglect their private activities to entirely devote
themselves to this one. Usually, this implies that the time left available to comply
with this duty is very limited and often confined to attending commission meetings
only.
•  Commission integration has not been organized to allow the most qualified
members to be part of it. Experts are ever more needed because the economy
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integration of the commissions may affect and be affected by the interpretation of
the legislation related to the defense of competition. For example, emphasis on
punishing conduct contrary to competition, where concrete evidence of such
conducts is fundamental, should demand the presence of a legally trained
professional. On the other hand, the stress on defending competition should be
associated with the need of specialists in market organization (economics).
•  In many cases, the commissions are not independent of political power, especially
the government. This is a particularly delicate aspect when considering possible
conflicts between the Antitrust Commissions and State organizations such as state-
owned companies, superintendence offices, regulatory entities, among others.
•  Antitrust Commissions have not been properly defined in terms of the relations with
the Judiciary System. Such Commissions in Chile are part and are not part of the
judicial power pyramid. It is not clear how the Supreme Court is going to revise
judgements made by the Antitrust Resolution Commission, what adds uncertainty to
do business in Chile because the scarce preparation on economic grounds that the
member of the Supreme Court have.
•  Antitrust commissions overlap with regulatory entities. Almost all over the Latin
American countries with an institutional framing for the defense of competition,
little attention has been paid to the fact that the antitrust commissions have become
co-regulators of the system. Many of the decisions made by the administrative
authorities have been rejected by the firms affected by such measures, thus paving
the way to the kind of opportunistic conduct that ends up partly sidestepping
regulation. Administrative decisions delay strategy has been widely used  by
companies in the energy and telecommunications sectors in Chile during the 1990s
and more recently.
•  The Fiscalía Nacional Económica has economic constraints for hiring the number
of appropriate well-paid staff that would be needed; additionally, neither are the
funds enough to commission studies or hire specialists in the diverse issues
involved. This situation has been partially resolved with the Reform DL 211, in
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In the light of the information contributed, it is relevant to comprehensively revise the
institutional framing for the defense of competition, including the aims of the institutions
and their structure, their integration and the faculties of both the antitrust commissions
and of the regulatory entities. The result of this comprehensive revision will help to
determine with greater certainty what aspects of each of the institutional framing
elements must be strengthened.
i. Clarifying  the Aims of the Legislation for the Defense of Competition
The priority in updating the institutional framing for the defense of competition is to
clearly define the aims of the legislation. This is particularly valid in a context in which
the option has been not to define the criminal conducts themselves. Along with the
strengthening of the traditional role in the regulation of unfair practices, it should be
expected that:
•  Commissions and regulators defend competition. With reference to basic services,
deregulation of potentially competitive markets should be supported.
•  Antitrust commissions become organizations of  consultancy and permanent
discussion for regulatory entities. Nevertheless, to be able to play this critical role, it
is necessary to make the commissions more independent of the Executive Power.
ii.  Antitrust Resolution Commission with Full Time Members
To have a more professional Antitrust Resolution Commission by having full time
commissioners (judges) is a necessary condition for recruiting professionals trained on
industrial organization. Moreover, these members should have this as their main activity.
By doing so, uncertainty on judgements and the delay on resolution may be reduced.
Resources should be made available to find the appropriate professionals who could
accept and dedicate themselves to a full time commitment. Special provisions should be
considered not to allow the pursuit of other activities, except perhaps for part time
academic activities, during the time the commission member remains in the position.
Similarly, there should also be explicit provisions not to allow certain activities to be
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iii.  Redefining the Mechanisms to Appoint Commission’s  Members
Redefining the appointment mechanisms of members seeks to help the members be
independent of political power as well as of the Judiciary system. The demands imposed
by modernization and the development of the Chilean economy toward an institutional
framing for the defense of competition require the corresponding resources and
personnel. A step forward is the training of professionals with a greater degree of
specialization and elimination of the hazards of the present appointment system.
The main obstacle to appoint the most appropriate candidates to occupy public
administration positions is perhaps the dependency on vested interest groups. To help
improve the situation, profound changes must be introduced in the appointment
procedures. Some of them are:
•  Essential changes in the selection of members by ad-hoc committees not directly
dependent on the executive power. The selection of the candidates must be
transparent. It is advisable the selection board enjoy the corresponding
qualifications and not be linked to other State branches; also, citizens should enjoy
the opportunity to have a say in this matter and there should be the possibility to
implement an enquiry system.
•  Changes in the commission members selection and appointment procedures. The
aim of the procedure to appoint these members is to select the most qualified
individuals to occupy the position, which is not an easy task since “qualification”
cannot be testified by third parties
14. The application process should be simple in
formalities, with ex-post information examination; it should be left to the interested
parties; substantive requirements should be demanded, like publications on related
issues in prestigious academic journals, experience in antitrust cases, and others;
transparency in the process should be improved by making the application process
equal the public selection rank, and making the candidates qualifications and
background publicly available.
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iv. Limiting Review of the Commission Decisions
The review of the commission decisions should be limited while, at the same time, the
formal protection of the commissions by the judicial power should be maintained.
Although the decisions made by the commissions should be subject to control by the
Judiciary, such control should be exercised over formal errors the members may have
generated, not over the fundamental content in the decisions.
Improved relations with the Judiciary system may help to avoid the main risk concerning
the appointed commissions; that is to say, the little concern with the procedures and due
process of law other than those followed by commissions (which occurs when the
defense of competition  is not within the control of the judicial power). Similarly, not
being part of the Judiciary prevents the possible inappropriate uses of legal appeals by
preventing complex technical matters be dealt with by members not skilled effecting
these areas (a situation that takes place when the commissions remain part of the judicial
system structure).
v. Referral of the Competition Defense Decisions to the Regulatory Entities
The power of the commissions that decide on regulations affecting free competition
should be limited.  They may become co-regulating agents of the decisions made by the
administrative authority.
One way to avoid such possibility is to have the regulatory entities resort to the
mentioned commissions for non-binding advice concerning the sector’s issues. This is
the way the administrative authority may count on a significant opinion on the matter
while free competition would not become the guiding principle of the management
regulation function. The institutional deficiencies relating to a matter under
administrative law (see next section) could be worsened and the above commented
situation might quickly turn into a functional equivalent to substitute for the failures of
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5. JUSTICE MODERNIZATION AND THE DEFENSE OF CONSUMERS
AND PERSONS
What is the appropriate role? What is the minimum expected of a modernized Judiciary
system more in accordance with a market economy?  These are the questions to be
addressed in this section. We also discuss the institutional requirements for the defense
of persons with respect to the State and the defense of consumers in relation to private
enterprises.
One of the fundamental components for market economy operation is an independent,
reliable judicial power that can settle increasingly complex technical matters. Unluckily,
both the legal proceedings applicable in economic issues and the commission members’
capacity to resolve these problems prove quite inadequate in Chile as well as all over
Latin America.
The judicial power system acknowledges the conflicting nature of the economic issues,
but antitrust commissions and arbitration systems have been created to deal with them.
However, a substantial portion of the disputes, sooner or later, is channeled out to the
central judiciary (especially to the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court), where the
economic disputes receive treatment similar to other legal cases. The major constraints
found in Chile’s judicial power system are the very low procedural efficiency, the
judges’ poor general economic background, the absence of specific commissions to treat
highly technical issues or the absence of courts for contentious- administrative cases.
These constraints increase the direct and indirect litigation costs: it is rather difficult to
predict the decisions to be made by judges, while a social and individual fair treatment
of the cases is not guaranteed.
Some authors go further and point out that a system based on Roman Law, mostly in
force all over Latin America, tends to inhibit the technological innovation process and
the entrepreneurial spirit that constitutes the essence of the market system, imposing too
many restraints on the private sector, which can only act according to law. By contrast,
Common Law is more ample and only punishes what is not permitted, which is
stimulating for the introduction of innovations (White, 1997).DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 33
5.1 Bottlenecks in the Judiciary
The Chilean judicial power system is not efficient in settling disputes because the
different procedural stages take a great deal of time. There is no systematic quantitative
analysis available concerning penal procedures, but different studies have shown that
even the most expeditious procedures are considerably slow in Chile, even compared
with those in other countries of Latin America which, it is said, enjoy lower institutional
standards. Figure Nº 4 summarizes the length of civil procedures in some of the Latin
American countries selected.
The data in the figure is consistent with other studies for Chile, where the summary civil
procedures last approximately an average of 2 years and 5 months (Cerda, 1993);  the
duration of contentious-administrative procedures related to alimony, visitation rights
and custody reach on average one year and 2 months in the initial instance stage only
(Universidad Diego Portales, 1994).
Similarly, in cases brought to the Antitrust Commission for unfair practices in Chile’s
energy sector, it was estimated that the average duration of the trials in the years
between 1989 and 1997 reached 2 years and 8 months, not including the Appeals to the
Supreme Court, where treatment and final decision took a similar time (Basañes, et al.,
2001).
Figure Nº 4:  Duration of Ordinary Civil Procedures
(two instances)
Country Duration
Argentina More than 2 years
Chile 2 years and 9 months
Colombia 2 years and 9 months
Costa Rica 10 months
Paraguay More than 2 years
Perú 4 years and 6 months
Uruguay 8 months
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This poor legal performance in Chile shows the need for modernizing the Judiciary
system, both in its procedures and in its structure. To such end, three changes should be
introduced:
•  To implement or strengthen reforms to civil and penal procedures to make them
more expeditious and reliable to the parties involved. These improvements are
complementary to the proposal for the creation of special commissions.
•  General and professional training of legal officers, and retraining of those who hold
office; specific economic training for judges.
•  Creation of special commissions to settle highly technical economic matters, and to
resolve problems or disputes derived from deeds or omissions committed by the
State to the detriment of individuals.
Next we refers to the last two changes mentioned above.
a)  Legal Reforms Implementation and Economic Training for Judges
As explained by Vargas (1999), when dealing with penal procedural reforms taking
place in Chile, the present procedures applicable virtually all over the countries in the
region and in most cases are the ordinary procedures followed for simple criminal
offenses.
These are the procedures that have been followed since the Inquisition days, according
to which the interest of the State in punishing crime is above the rights of the
individuals. The system, then, proves inefficient for the defense of the accused and
considerably affects the corresponding individual rights. Transparency is not present and
judges rarely get directly involved in the cases, which ultimately results in generalized
unfairness and legal administration inefficacy. Finally, in this system, the judge
investigates and passes sentence, thus giving rise to serious conflicts of interests related
to the situation of the judges in the administration of justice.
15
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It will be essential to introduce procedural reforms for civil actions in Chile, and also to
go deeper into the penal procedural reforms under way since the end of the 1990s. These
reforms need to focus on the implementation of oral, public, more simple and improved
procedures; that is to say, procedures entirely different from the procedures for civil
cases that are in force in Chile today. Whenever pertinent, before and during the
proceedings, the parties involved should be encouraged to accept mediation with the
assistance of a judge or of a mediator external to the judicial power system. This would
diminish the workload and would reorient the focus of the system from being a
punishing agent to making amends for the damage caused.
The main advantages of procedural reforms supported by mediation would be upgraded
legal services and the potential for the poorer sectors of the economy to gain access to
the services. This would improve procedures and would offer more efficiency, access
and transparency while, at the same time, the system could become more productive.
These kinds of reforms require well trained judges and legal professionals familiar with
economic issues, something that is not very common. Very few judges have received an
appropriate background in economics nor have they been trained to deal with economic
issues. These gaps in formal academic training to analyze economic issues raise two
major issues:
•  The considerable high degree of economic matters litigation in Chile. Very often,
bureaucracy or the absence of decision making power competence of the judges
delay procedures which should be shorter. The experts’ reports may frequently
exhibit little impartiality in this matter; they may even offer no substantive
contribution to the resolution of the case.
•  The judges tend to make decisions based exclusively on evidence derived from
unlawful  activities. In the economic field, concrete evidence of unfair practices is
hard to find; for example, to prove predatory practices is virtually an impossible
except when those who perpetrated them are extremely careless. However, it is
possible to punish circumstances in which there exists the founded suspicion of the
unfair practices. Even though by law  the judges may interpret and enforce law
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competent and have wide experience. A judge contrary to taking risks will probably
concentrate on tangible evidence to avoid incurring in legal errors.
The first issue, delay in resolving cases, is occasionally solved by the parties involved
with the assistance of independent arbitration. This is common practice in Chile and in
Argentina to settle disputes in regulated industries. Even though arbitrators have
intervened in settling important disputes, especially those in the public utility services,
they are not empowered to hold binding arbitration (for both parties), which
considerably restraints their effect. Consequently, consideration should be given to the
possibility of developing an arbitration system that carries with it the threat of
punishment for failure to follow through with the agreements.
However, the most important need is for judges with a knowledge of economic issues
and with decision making power based on the analysis of the conditions that allow
opportunistic conducts. Chile’s judicial power system should include a permanent
educational program in economic and legal matters; as mentioned before, profound
changes in procedures should also be made. Finally, the creation of special commissions
for economic issues and, in particular, for issues where the State is one of the parties
involved is becoming ever more necessary. This is dealt with next.
b) Special Commissions
The need to establish special commissions is not related solely to economic matters.
There are not many cases in the Latin American judiciary with such characteristics; there
are none of the sort in Chile. Consequently, it is possible to think of having economic
commissions, contentious-administrative commissions perhaps, like those already
functioning in Argentina, France or Spain, or with a more comprehensive scope, to deal
with different economic issues, with or without the presence of the State.
16
                                                                
16 There have been proposals already. The government of Chile, through  Comisión de
Modernización de la  Institucionalidad  Reguladora  del  Estado (Committee for the
Modernization of the State Regulator Institutional Framework) in 1998 suggested the
creation of national economic commissions, which would represent only an instance for
further appeal in matters related to competition and basic services. Unfortunately, this idea
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Having special economic commissions would mean an improved justice administration,
quicker procedures and more efficiency, access and transparency in the functioning of
the judiciary system as legal decisions related to influential groups could be made
independently, helping to prevent corruption within the judiciary itself. In practical
terms, these advantages would be the direct consequence of two separate innovations to
be introduced in the mentioned special commissions:
•  In civil economic cases: the courts have become overburdened with basic services
payment or interpretation of contracts between private parties, mainly oral public
procedures stripped of formalities would make the system work more quickly. For
example, over 60% of civil and penal actions are related to matters not requiring the
intervention of a judge; only the bureaucratic procedures, such as in aggressive
collection causes (excluding the trial itself), making inheritance effective,
reassigning legal budgets, miners’ demonstrations, and others, could be required.
•  More complex cases: would demand a closer more profound analysis of the
corresponding sources and implications. Consequently, specially trained staff should
be hired to support the judges in these matters, thus allowing the latter to have a
more comprehensive view of the dispute to be settled.
There would be three potential economic quantifiable gains from such changes. First,
time saving for the system users, which could be significant in the more complex cases
since they generally involve hiring professionals of high alternative cost and the interests
at stake are enormous. Secondly, reduction in the number of cases that could be referred
to the courts of appeal, a direct consequence of better assessed and better made decisions
in the first instance. Finally, the market system credibility, since the state would be
subject to legal scrutiny in administrative acts affecting persons, especially in the case of
regulation of basic services.
5.2 Consumer Rights and Defense Bodies
We believe it is also possible to introduce the Ombudsman in Chile. Although in Chile
this office has recently been opened (2002), it has not been thought out in accordance
with a regulator institutional framework; rather, an organization parallel to the state,
open to society as a whole and independent of political pressure groups, with the main38 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE
aim of defending people before political power abuses. We, at least, feel sure it is not an
entity meant to defend people from deeds or omissions of the State related to the type of
litigation occurring in the regulated public utility services.
The Servicio Nacional del Consumidor (SERNAC) [Consumer Defense Agency] should
be made stronger. This is the office in charge of informing the consumers and,
eventually, defending them from abuses by the business sector. A side discussion is the
introduction of novel instruments to award people the possibility to defend themselves in
cases where the whole population may be affected, like, for example, incorporating class
action suits, widely known in the United States, to our judicature. This could make the
elimination of barriers possible, for people to have access to a better and more efficient
administration of justice.
It is important to mention that the recent modification to the consumers protection act
(enacted in July, 2004) incorporates the idea of class actions suits through the figure of
consumers fuzzy rights.  However, in a narrower sense than that used in the United
States.
6. MAIN CONCLUSIONS
Chile, with its liberalization reforms of the final quarter of the 21th Century, is heading
toward the development of a market economy. Substantial structural transformations
were introduced that granted the private sector greater predominance in the provision of
goods and services, in infrastructure development and in human capital accumulation. In
part of the 1980s and the 1990s, the country enjoyed high sustained growth that, we
believe, is the result of the mentioned reforms implementation.
The institutional structure of Chile’s economy, the state apparatus most particularly, is
incompatible with the efficient functioning of the market that the reforms were meant to
open. The absence of profound changes in State administration, in the administration of
justice and in the regulatory agencies and competition institutions does not guarantee theDOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 39
Chilean economy can reach the high sustained growth rates needed to lead the country to
full economic development.
The root of the efficiency and efficacy problem in the functioning of the State is to be
found in the absence of adequate incentives and regulation mechanisms for persons and
for public entities. There is generalized weakness in the public administration evaluation
mechanisms that should praise individual and corporate achievements, and punish
indolence, inefficiency and the little effort to obtain the desired objectives. Instead, little
individual accountability responsibility is the result. Furthermore, the State in Chile has
traditionally acknowledged little weight to public opinion; tax payers stand poor chances
of obtaining information related to the destiny given to their taxes or of having a say in
their application, or of recalling inefficient corrupt public officers.
Chile must also respond to the challenge of implementing regulatory frameworks and
competition defense bodies to reap the benefits of market liberalization and privatization
of state-owned enterprises. In practice, there are numerous constraints that prevent
regulators from inhibiting rent seeking in sectors where private firms operate in
monopolistic conditions. There are three reasons to account for this situation: our
regulatory entities are technically weak to enforce the existing regulation; the regulatory
framework is not complete and may be the source of ambiguities that give rise to
opportunism; occasionally, regulation is particularly complex, from a technical point of
view.
The regulatory entities must be independent of political power and of the regulated
sectors, which presupposes profound changes to the institutional framing of basic
services. The regulatory organizations’ institutional power must be strengthened to be
able to efficiently resolve the ambiguities within the basic services regulatory
framework. Not much has been done to identify them and thus modify the norms and
regulations. Unfortunately, it is only when opportunistic conducts appear that such
ambiguities come to the surface.
The means to achieve regulation must be perfected. Currently, the focus is on direct
regulation, in which a regulation is implemented and then punishment applied if it is not40 TOWARD A MODERN STATE IN CHILE
compliance. Indirect regulation appears to be better; that is to say, the introduction of
market elements in regulation. The purpose is to improve incentives so that the agents
themselves develop an interest in compliance.
Governance structure must be redefined to benefit from economies of scope between the
role of regulator and that of competition defense. The responsibility for defending
consumer rights and competition typically belongs to Antitrust Commissions; educating
and informing consumers is virtually non existent given the SERNAC institutional
weakness.
Chile’s performance in legal matters points to the need for a significant updating of both
the procedures and the structure of the judicial power system. To reduce the present
weaknesses, the following changes are needed: a) implementing or strengthening
reforms to civil and penal procedures to make them more expeditious and reliable to the
parties involved (including special commissions for economic cases); b) professional
education of the judicial power officers and the retraining of those currently active as
civil servants, with particular emphasis on training judges in specific economic matters;
c) setting special commissions to resolve highly technical economic issues or settle
litigation derived from deeds or omissions by the State to the detriment of persons.
Finally, we should note that the future development of Chile requires attention to
corruption, that is so very widespread over most of the Latin American countries. This
scourge causes substantial direct costs in the political, economic and social spheres that
diminish, if not inhibit, the gains from structural reforms, privatization and market
openness to private sector participation. Any reform to the role of the State, in
management, structure, regulation and competition bodies or the Judiciary system, will
ultimately be unsuccessful in the presence of high corruption rates.DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 277 41
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